New Cold War in the Arctic

FT writes that there is no verified evidence that Chinese or Russian naval forces are operating “around” Greenland, and Nordic governments citing NATO intelligence have publicly rebutted such claims.

What is verified, however, is that Russia has significantly expanded its Arctic military posture compared to the post-Cold War low point over the last years, particularly through Northern Fleet infrastructure, bastion defense, and undersea capabilities. While submarine deployments remain classified, NATO and IISS assessments confirm renewed Russian submarine activity relevant to the critical choke point named GIUK Gap, reviving a Cold War-era strategic concern.

China does not have a verified naval or submarine presence in the GIUK, but its Arctic role is expanding through economic, scientific, and institutional engagement alongside Russia. The Northern Sea Route is being systematically developed by Moscow with Chinese cooperation - officially commercial, but structurally dual-use in an increasingly militarized Arctic theater.

The strategic reality is neither Arctic hysteria nor denial as it is usually the case in Europe: Greenland is not encircled, but the High North remains a real exposure and will be key strategic theatre in the New Cold War, with the DragonBear risk vector being asymmetric, long-term, and primarily Russian, while China shapes the enabling environment geoeconomically and indirectly geopolitically through the militarization in the Indo-Pacific region.

The facilitation of the Northern Sea Route (China’s Polar Silk Road) will reduce the maritime transport between Asia and Europe by 40% and Russia is the entry ticket for China to become Arctic nation. It starts with geoeconomic power projection but the geostrategy of the DragonBear entails dual-use infrastructure and military installations along the Arctic coasts of Russia.

It was also not coincidental that China had shown sustained interest in Greenland’s critical raw materials, especially rare earths and uranium, but political and regulatory decisions in Greenland and Denmark have blocked implementation. Beyond mining, China has also explored infrastructure-linked access (ports, airports, logistics hubs) that could indirectly support resource extraction. Several such initiatives were blocked or discouraged due to security concerns raised by Denmark and the United States, particularly after Greenland’s strategic importance became central to Arctic and North Atlantic security planning.

Against this background, Greenland must be considered as a denied strategic space, not an ignored one. The Arctic reality in Cold War 2.0 is therefore neither hysteria nor denial: Greenland is not encircled, but the High North remains a real exposure, with the DragonBear risk vector becoming asymmetric, primarily Russian in military terms, and Chinese in shaping the long-term geo-economic environment.